Nova Scotia/Nunavut Command of The Royal Canadian Legion www.ns.legion.ca 89 Plans & Preparations Originally conceived in April 1942 by Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ), and code named 'Operation Rutter', the Allies planned to conduct a major, division size, raid on a German held port on the French channel coast and to hold it for the duration of at least two tides. They would cause the greatest amount of destruction of enemy facilities and defences before withdrawing. This original plan was approved by the Chiefs of Staff in May 1942. It included dropping paratroops inland of the port, prior to a frontal amphibious assault. However, with the involvement of paratroops, the raid was vulnerable to weather conditions in the area. General Montgomery was to supply the bulk of the troops from his South Eastern Command but the Canadian Government pressed for Canadian troops to see some action. The Canadian 2nd Division, under the command of Major-General 'Ham' Roberts was, subsequently, selected for the main force. The 237 vessels, 5,000 Canadians, 1,000 British and 50 US Rangers assembled in five ports on the south coast of England between Southampton and Newhaven. In support were 74 squadrons of aircraft, of which 60 were fighter squadrons. Early rehearsals were disastrous and, by the time they improved, the consistently bad weather caused delay. Montgomery felt the security of the operation was compromised, since the troops had been briefed and German fighter-bombers had attacked the troopships and the supporting fleet gathered in the Solent, causing damage to two vessels. On July 7th, the raid was postponed and the continued unsettled weather conditions just added to the gloom as the troops and shipping were dispersed. Had Montgomery not been ordered to Egypt to take command of the Eighth Army, the continued representations he never made may have prevailed, as it was, in the weeks ahead, the plan was rejuvenated and renamed 'Jubilee'. Although the original planning had been undertaken by COHQ, an inter-service committee representing Air, Army and Naval forces contrived to make the operation less weather dependant by replacing the paratroops with seaborne troops from No 3 and 4 Army Commandos. They also reduced the scale of the planned air bombardment to minimise the risk of French casualties but, to compensate, provided 8 destroyers to bombard the shore. There would be 27 Churchill tanks in support of the main infantry assault. The final plan, accepted by all 3 services and the Chiefs of Staff, envisaged assault landings at eight separate locations in the vicinity of Dieppe. The Royal Marine Commando were to land in fast motor launches after the main landing to destroy the dock and recover documents thought to be held in a port office. A raid of this size involving over 200 vessels, 6000 troops and 3000 naval personnel would allow the Allies to evaluate the effectiveness of their training, equipment, communications and strategies. This amphibious assault landing on a defended coast would be the first undertaken by the British since Gallipoli 26 years earlier. There had been changes too in the capability of the defenders, so it seemed prudent to reflect on the experience of a raid this size before embarking upon the largest amphibious invasion force in human history, with consequences to match. Although they didn't know it at the time, their intelligence on the enemy forces and the local topography was patchy. The cavelike gun positions in the cliffs on both sides of the main landing beaches were not recognised on Allied air reconnaissance photographs and the suitability of the beaches in terms of gradient, surface and sub surface for heavy tanks was assessed by examining holiday snapshots and postcards. Furthermore, the Germans were aware of Allied interest in Dieppe, because of increased radio chatter, the concentration of landing craft and their own spy networks. Commando forces were to land in pre-dawn darkness; No 3 Commando approximately eight miles east of Dieppe to silence the coastal battery near Berneval, No 4 Commando and 50 US Rangers to neutralize the coastal battery near Varengeville, six miles west of Dieppe. In both cases they would make two landings to affect a pincer movement on the batteries, which each had a cadre of over a hundred. Both of these gun positions could easily range on assault ships positioned off Dieppe, so their neutralisation was important. An assault force would land at four separate locations, immediately to the east of Dieppe at Puys and immediately west at Pourville, half an hour before the main assault. Their objective was to disable the guns and machine gun nests on the cliffs that covered the main landing beaches east and west of the town. continued ... continued ... Major-General ‘Ham’ Roberts
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